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 Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives in Ethiopia: 
what role for on-farm conservation of sorghum genetic resources? 
 
Abstract 
Crop genetic resources are the building blocks of sustainable agricultural development due to 
their relevance not only as inputs for variety development but also as indigenous crop 
insurance mechanisms through traditional variety portfolio management. Their continuous 
survival is, however, threatened by natural and human driven factors. This threat has induced 
the need for designing conservation measures. Among the in situ and ex situ conservation 
options available to conserve crop genetic resources, on-farm conservation has recently 
attracted enormous attention. To make this option operational, placing incentives (that link 
conservation with utilization) and removal of perverse incentives are believed to be crucial so 
that landraces of no immediate interest to farmers can be conserved. However, before 
designing sound incentives and/or removing perverse incentives, we have to understand 
farmers’ motives for managing a portfolio of traditional varieties. 
To address our objective, we have adopted a utility based model that considers on-farm 
diversity as a positive externality of farmers’ livelihood decisions. Accordingly, on-farm 
diversity is considered as the derived outcome of farmers’ revealed preferences subject to 
their concerns and constraints. To empirically test the relationships, a Poisson regression 
model is estimated using rural household survey data collected from 198 sorghum growing 
farmers in East Ethiopia. 
The results have shown the most important diversity promoting factors and those factors 
detaching the link between farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives and their spillover effects on 
sorghum diversity. Based on the results, the paper concludes outlining the policy implications 
of the findings.  
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1. Introduction: background and research question  
Crop genetic resources (CGRs)
1 are the building blocks of sustainable agricultural 
development for their role not only as inputs for variety development but also as indigenous 
crop insurance mechanisms through traditional variety portfolio management. CGRs have 
current use values and option values. One of their main use values for Ethiopian smallholders 
is that managing a portfolio of traditional varieties ensures the survival in marginal areas. As 
to their option value, CGRs are the raw materials for breeding to deal with any potential 
agricultural problems.  
Despite existing uncertainties concerning the extent and rate of the diversity decline in CGRs 
(Virchow, 1999), the conservation of CGRs is taking place. It is based on two pillars: ex situ 
and in situ conservation
2. Although ex situ conservation is still dominantly utilized, in situ 
conservation has recently entered the stage for conservation of intra-species diversity of 
CGRs
3. Among the different in situ conservation options for CGRs, conservation on farmers’ 
fields (on-farm management) has recently received a considerable attention by governments, 
NGOs and the international community. However, despite a lot of discourse in its favor, there 
is no adequate contextual research done as to how on-farm management can be made feasible 
complement to ex  situ conservation. Because on-farm management of CGRs cannot be 
                                                 
1 Plant genetic resources are resources including farmers’ varieties (crops as cultivated species) and non-cultivated species from other plant 
species (Heywood, 1995). CGRs in this paper refer to farmers’ varieties. 
2 Promoting ex situ and in situ conservation activities are two of the 20 priority areas of the ‘Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture’ (see FAO, 1996). 
3 Ex situ refers to conservation of genetic resources outside their natural habitats while in situ involves conservation of these resources in 
their natural environment. Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 2 
 
undertaken in a vacuum, farmers’ diversification motivations and the effect of their working 
environment on the level of their contribution to crop diversity have to be understood for 
justified and efficient interventions. This will enable decision-makers to comprehend how 
policy (through different incentive mechanisms) can better influence farmers’ variety 
management behavior. 
Many studies acknowledge that farmers play a key role in maintaining traditional varieties. 
Indeed, on-farm maintenance of CGRs is a positive externality of the farm activities driven by 
farmers’ survival first motives involving issues far from simple profit maximization. As 
farmers are not maintaining diversity for its own sake, their conservation efforts are usually 
coined in the literature as ‘de facto conservation’ (Meng et al., 1998). However, ‘de facto 
conservation’ is less than what society wants to have because for one thing no farmer 
produces diversity for its own sake; secondly, each farmer decides independently based on his 
or her expectations. Moreover, farmers are using observable characteristics of the varieties for 
their decisions. For these reasons, there could be landraces not of interest for any farmer 
(resulting in extinction) and there could be landraces of interest for thousands of farmers 
(resulting in redundancy). Hence, although farmers have a role to play, governments cannot 
entirely depend on their derived conservation activities. Non-optimal diversity produced by 
farmers as an impure public good calls for the need to change the status quo. Moreover, due 
to missing markets and transaction costs, the social and private marginal benefits of 
maintaining crop diversity are not identical and therefore the level of conservation will again 
be sub-optimal. 
For those landraces which are either not conserved by farmers ‘de facto’ and are, hence, 
threatened by extinction, or are not conserved at a social optimal level, incentive measures are 
needed to improve the non-optimality through harmonizing their variety choice criteria with 
national CGRs conservation strategies (McNeely, 1988). However, before designing sound 
incentive mechanisms for promoting on-farm conservation and/or removing perverse 
incentives (like linking of access to fertilizer or credit with the adoption of specific cultivars), 
decision-makers have to be informed on how and why de facto conservation occurs. 
As a first step in the incentive design, the focus of this paper lies on identifying the farm 
household, market and agro-ecological factors behind farmers’ life long contribution to 
society in saving some of the country’s genetic stock. The research questions to be addressed 
are, therefore, ‘How do farmers’ survival first motives promote diversity and what factors 
induce on-farm ‘de facto conservation’? and ’What role do these results play for on-farm 
conservation policy’?  
Ethiopia, as the center of origin and diversity for many crops (for instance, teff, coffea 
arabica, enset, sorghum), can be a very good example of genetic resource rich countries with 
meager financial means to undertake costly conservation programs (von Braun and Virchow, 
1996). Moreover, the success of agriculture as the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy is 
closely related to the potential of the different crop varieties to perform under various stress 
conditions (disease, pests, and drought). Thus, addressing Ethiopia’s increasing food 
production demand requires maintaining the agro-biodiversity for present and future potential 
use.  
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 considers the theory and 
the econometric model to be followed by data description in section 3. The regression results 
are presented in section 4. Finally, conclusions and policy implications are drawn in section 5. 
2. The theory: farmers’ utility maximization constrained by survival motives leading to 
on-farm diversity 
The theoretical formulation of the utility based household multiple variety (crop) decision 
model follows van Dusen (2000) who derives the diversity function inculcating missing 
markets and risks in steps. Farmers’ preferences for varieties are conditioned on different Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 3 
 
preference parameters. Assuming a well behaved utility function, the farmers’ utility 
maximization problem can be set as: 
) / , ( : 0 ϖ p f G G U U Max =  (1) 
where Gf and Gp refer to aggregate consumption of on-farm produced and purchased goods, 
respectively, and ϖ0 refers to the vector of household level exogenous factors including input 
endowments and heterogeneity (land and labor), human capital (age and education), asset 
endowment (livestock and wealth), and access factors (extension and credit). 
The utility is subject to the following constraints: 
Y Y G c G G p f g ≤ + − − & & ) ; ( ) ( 0 ϖ    Full income constraint (2) 
where G, pg, c and ÿ are the aggregate produced good on-farm, price of the aggregate 
agricultural good, cost of production for the agricultural good and income from income 
sources outside agriculture, respectively. The full income constraint encompasses labor 
constraint, cash constraint, and livestock feed constraint. 
L L L L L Hired NF leisure F ≤ + + +    Labor constraint (3) 
where LF, LLeisure, LNF, LHired and L refer to labor used on the farm, labor used for leisure, labor 
used for non-farm economic activities, and household labor endowment, respectively.  






i i rentout rentin own ≤ + + = − + ∑ ∑
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   Land constraint (4) 
) , ( m f G G P = 0   Production technology constraint (5) 
where Gm refers to aggregate on-farm produced good sold in the market. The production 
technology is conditional on choices (varieties and crop enterprises). Assuming perfect 
markets and risk free environment, the first order conditions of this problem lead, among 
other things, to the following optimum level of production: 
) ; , ( 0
* * ϖ m f G G G G =    (6) 
Quantities of goods produced are aggregated here for simplifying the exposition. Multiple 
output production can also be derived similarly (Singh and Janakiram, 1986). The household 
chooses a set of varieties, crop enterprises and inputs to arrive at the optimum level of 
production of each enterprise. While trying to meet their household objectives, farmers not 
only produce and consume crop output but also maintain diverse set of traditional varieties of 
crops year after year as a positive externality of their farm decisions.  
Utility optimization results not only in an optimum level of production but also the derived 
demand for crop and variety diversification (Ddd) or number of varieties and crops planted 
subject to the factors motivating farmers to diversify i.e. 
] [ 0 2 1 3 2 1 ; ..., , / ..., , ϖ n n dd c c c v v v v D + + + + + + + =    (7) 
where vi’s index varieties and ci’s index crop enterprises, respectively, so that vi and ci take 1 
if the household chooses the variety or the crop enterprise, and zero otherwise, respectively. If 
the only farm household´s concern is income, with constant returns to scale, perfect markets, 
and homogeneous land, the household will plant a single variety in a risk free environment 
that leads to specialization and no diversity on-farm
4. 
If the farmers’ working environment is given, the genetic composition of crop diversity on-
farm (Dhh) is a function of their on-farm management practices (Mp) and natural factors 
affecting the ecological interactions (Nf) i.e.  
) , ; ( f p dd hh N M D f D =    (8) 
Market access and lower transaction costs simplify farmers’ life and nullify the need for 
farmers to be self-sufficient (de Janvry et al., 1991). When farmers have access to markets, 
extension, roads, etc., many of the goods and services provided by crop diversity can be 
substituted by alternatives that can be purchased in the market. Thus, the production of 
                                                 
4
 Diversity may or may not occur at the regional or national level depending on the diversity among households. Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 4 
 
diversity will shrink (Bellon, 1996). Missing markets bring additional input and output 
constraints by forcing farmers to be self-sufficient.  
Thus, utility maximization under missing markets requires farmers to balance input demand 
with own supply i.e. 
) / , , ( : 1 ϖ g p f NM G G U U Max =    (9) 
where ϖ1 includes ϖ0 plus constraints related to access input and output markets. Missing 
markets force farmers to balance the quantity of non-marketed goods (NMg) to household 
demand (HHdd), labor demand to own labor supply and land use to own land, i.e.  
NMg = HHdd                                                    Output constraint with missing markets (10) 
As a result of this constraint, the production technology constraint above also includes NM
*
g. 
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   Land constraint with missing markets (12) 
The optimum level of production from traded and non-traded enterprises will then be: 
) ; , ( 1
* * ϖ g f NM G G G =    (13) 
From each crop enterprise, the number of traditional varieties is still the derived outcome of 
household utility maximization. 
The next most important variable worth considering is risk. Farmers’ risk aversion behavior is 
governed by the extent to which it affects their livelihood. While risk is forcing farmers to 
take cautionary measures, their reaction to it mainly depends on their sensitivity to potential 
shocks that, in turn, is highly dependent on their wealth status. While wealthy farmers can 
smoothen consumption, non-wealthy farmers are highly sensitive to potential farm income 
variability (Murduch, 1995). One of the indigenous means for farmers to deal with risk is 
traditional variety portfolio management.  
Taking the results of previous literature that synthesizes relationships among risk, 
consumption smoothing and wealth (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Murduch, 1995) and 
adapting Roy’s safety first model (Roy, 1952), farmers are trading expected return for reduced 
risk. If there is expected higher net return with higher yield risk (say from adopting an 
improved variety) and/or lower expected net return with lower yield variability (say from 
using multiple traditional varieties), the farmer’s decision depends on the extent to which the 
household is able to fulfill basic needs (Basicreq) from its internal endowment (wealth plus 
expected ‘risk free’ farm and non-farm income denoted as FNincome). The farmer’s objective is 
thus to:  
Min Prob. (FNincome < Basicreq) ⇒ Prob.(FNincome - Basicreq < 0)   (14) 
Accordingly, the farmer will gamble with nature if FNincome > Basicreq and he/she will take 
more cautionary measures if FNincome< Basicreq. In our case, FNincome is computed as the sum 
of value of livestock, annual income from ch‘tat
5 (Chata Edulis) and annual estimated income 
from non-farm income sources
6. Given this framework, risk is proxied by the extent to which 
the farm household is able to satisfy Basicreq. Putting both FNincome and Basicreq on per-capita 
basis
7,  
Riskproxy = GAPPC = SAFTYPC - REQPC  (15) 
Inculcating risk in the derivation of the optimum level of production, first order conditions 
lead to: 
) ; , ( 2
* * ϖ g f NM G G G =    (16) 
                                                 
5
 Cht’at is a very important stimulant and perennial cash crop in the study area. 
6 We used not only income but also wealth to compute FNincome because farmers sell their wealth when income falls short of current 
consumption needs. Data were collected from the head of each household on the Basicreq and components of FNincome.. 
7 Consumption requirements of household members have been adjusted. Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 5 
 
where ϖ2 is ϖ1 and concerns (risk and safety first). 
As far as risk is concerned, the hypothesis to be tested is, therefore, the more negative 
GAPPC is the higher will be the portfolio of traditional varieties maintained (to stabilize farm 
income) by a farm household. In the context of the utility function, risk can be considered as 
part of the full income constraint. 
Farmers’ variety management decisions involve both discrete (whether or not to plant) and 
continuous (how much) decisions. Diversity is mainly a function of the discrete decision (van 
Dusen, 2000). Thus, we shall consider the process of diversity production as involving a set of 
discrete choice decisions by farmers. Accordingly, the number of varieties and/or crop 
enterprises on each farm is given by:  
] [ 2 2 1 3 2 1 ; ..., , / ..., , ϖ n n dd c c c v v v v D + + + + + + + =    (17) 
Consider, for simplicity, a farmer who is planting only sorghum and getting income only from 
this crop. If the farmer’s utility is derived from ‘n’ varieties that are the combination of 
varieties that provide the total satisfaction, then the total utility is apportioned among the ‘n’ 
varieties. If each variety is contributing equally to the farmer’s utility, each one is taking 
equal share of the farmer’s resources. If a farmer decides to have a single variety, he is 
satisfying all his utility and household concerns only with a single variety. 
Thus, there are multiple variety use decisions (by millions of farmers) resulting in multiple 
varieties on-farm and cumulatively contributing to regional or national diversity. Repetition of 
a series of binomial choices by thousands of farmers asymptotically converges to a Poisson 
distribution. The summation of a series of discrete choices can be approximated using a 
Poisson regression for a count of the total number of varieties produced (Pudney, 1989; 
Hellerstein and Mendelsohn, 1993). As a result, we are using the Poisson model not only 
because it is consistent with the theoretical framework but also because the number of 
traditional varieties maintained on-farm (diversity index used in this paper) are integer counts. 
Count diversity index is computed as the number of traditional varieties identified minus one 
(Taillie and Patil, 1982). Poisson regression model is the benchmark for analyzing count data 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
The Poisson regression model assumes that yi given xi is Poisson distributed with density: 
2 , 1 , 0 ,
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   (18) 
and mean parameter, E[yi|xi] = λi = exp( β
'
i x ). 
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   (19) 
where the xi’s are the variables (described in section 3) affecting on-farm diversity (yi).  
The Poisson model is, however, typically restrictive as it imposes the restriction that the 
variance of the data is equal to the conditional mean i.e. var(yi/xi, β) = E(yi/xi, β). Checking 
this in our data set using regression based tests for over or under-dispersion suggested by 
Cameron and Trivedi (1990) consistently shows under-dispersion. 
The easiest way to solve this problem is to use the Poisson model with the robust (sandwich) 
covariance matrix because the Poisson model stays consistent under violation of the equi-
dispersion assumption (Winkelmann, 1995). For this reason, the robust methods of estimating 
Poisson models have been used to compute the Huber/White robust standard errors reported 
in Table 2. 
3. Data description 
The data were collected based on a stratified random sampling technique to draw a sample of 
198 sorghum growing farmers in Eastern Hararghe, Western Hararghe and Dire Dawa zones 
of Ethiopia. Farmers were interviewed in 2001/2002 using a structured questionnaire.  Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 6 
 
There are six major purposes (food, cash, animal feed, fuel wood, house construction, and 
fence construction) of growing sorghum in the study area. The average number of traditional 
varieties of sorghum grown is 1.84 for the sampled households. 74 of the households had 
reported to have a single traditional variety; the other 84 had 2 varieties; 33 of them had 3 
local varieties, and the last 5 had 4 varieties. For the estimation purpose, the last ones are 
censored to 3 since they are very few.  
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
Table 1 defines the variables used in the regression, gives the expected signs based on the 
theoretical predictions, and provides descriptive statistics for the respective variables. The 
variable ‘totlabor’ is computed excluding the dependents (children below 9 and inactive 
household members because of age or permanent sickness). Household members aged 16-59 
get value 1. Children between age 9-15 get an equivalence of 40%, and household members 
above the age of 60 get 60% equivalence. Children going to school are assumed to spend 40% 
of their time on-farm. All these conversions are based on the discussions made with the key 
informants during the survey.  
Only 41% of the sampled households have reported to have earned non-farm income that is 
rather low. The average grade of schooling for the heads of the sampled households is 1.37 
with a maximum of 11 and minimum of zero. Farmers’ experience with improved varieties 
ranges from 0 to 10 with a mean of 2 years. 35.4 percent of them have reported to have been 
involved in formal or informal credit.  
The mean ‘GAPPC’ is positive implying that on average all households can more than satisfy 
Basicreq if incomes are equally re-distributed. However, the variation is very high ranging 
from -1098 to +1090 mainly due to the income from a cash crop cht’at. Those farmers who 
produce and sell cht’at are exceptionally better-off which could inflate the average figure. The 
details of the data description can be found in Wale (2003).
 
4. Estimation results and related discussions 
Table 2 below reports the parameter estimates of the model and the relative importance of the 
different variables considered (marginal effects). The variables Belinarba (24), Kerodeda (34), 
Asselliso, Ejeaneni (34), Chachole (36), and Gurbo (15) are all the village dummy variables 
meant to capture any village differences not accounted by the other variables
8. The village 
Umerkule is left as a reference. 
 
HERE TABLE 2 
 
The goodness of fit tests have given insignificant χ
2-tests indicating that the Poisson is an 
appropriate model to explain count diversity. The LR test has been used to check significance 
of the inclusion of a set of variables. The variables considered were classified into safety 
factors (GAPPC), concerns (nopurpose), endowment factors (lancrops, educate, plots, and 
totlabor), village dummies (Belinarba, Kerodeda, Asseliso, Ejeaneni, Chachole, and Gurbo) 
and access factors (access, ch’tat, impexep, credit and nonffarm)
 9. The test fails to accept H0 
in all cases implying that all sets of variables are important in explaining on-farm diversity. 
Most of the results confirm a priori expectations showing that factors such as diversity of 
farmers’ concerns being met by producing sorghum, farmers’ sensitivity to income shocks, 
land heterogeneity, land size, and age are the key factors for variety diversification. These 
factors are significantly motivating farmers to produce diversity by managing a portfolio of 
traditional sorghum varieties. According to the results, farmers are not able to get multiple 
                                                 
8 The numbers in brackets are the number of households sampled in each village. 
9
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traits they want from a single variety and the increase in the relative importance of sorghum to 
household utility is one of the motivating factors for diversification of traditional sorghum 
variety. On the contrary, access to extension and market integration, experience in using 
improved varieties and growing cash crops are detaching the link between ‘de facto’ 
conservation and farmers’ economic decisions.  
This result demonstrates one of the challenges in the seemingly simple on-farm conservation 
being advocated and sends a pre-cautionary message so that government and other concerned 
organizations should attempt to address both conservation and agricultural productivity 
objectives. As a poor man’s crop, the financially non-rewarding sorghum is liable for 
replacement by cash crop farming. Heterogeneity of the farming system (cash crop farming 
and food crop farming) as well as the coexistence of crops of different importance in a region 
lead to endangering the less important and less rewarding crops which, in turn, requires costly 
interventions due to higher opportunity costs of maintaining food crop diversity in the 
presence of high value crops such as Cht’at.  
The variable ‘educate’ has unexpected sign. Running a two-limit Tobit regression on the 
proportion of use of improved varieties has shown that education does not significantly affect 
use of improved varieties, which could partly explain the unexpected sign in Table 2. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
Overall, the empirical results have shown that ‘de facto’ conservation is mainly a poor man’s 
undertaking with no access to cash crop farming, markets, credit, and extension. CGRs 
diversity is mainly produced by subsistent and marginal farmers as a positive externality of 
their ‘survival first’ strategies. These farmers are maintaining a level of crop diversity through 
their farm-specific production system according to the individual optima of the decision-
making process at the farm level.  
Economic development, poverty reduction and income distribution argue that the 
economically and ecologically marginalized areas, where most of CGRs diversity is produced 
until now, need external investment in infrastructure and technology to improve the 
production limitations. However, as rural development interventions are put in place 
(improved access to extension, markets, use of improved varieties, and growing cash crops), 
the amount of area utilized by traditional varieties, the amount of varieties per farm and, 
therefore, the level of diversity will decrease. As long as farmers’ contribution to 
agrobiodiversity is not valued
10, and as long as CGRs are not valued by their own right, the 
level of crop diversity produced by marginalized farmers will be negatively correlated to the 
over-all agricultural development in a specific region, leading to an uncontrolled loss of 
CGRs.  
If it is the political will of the Ethiopian government to maintain the diversity of CGRs on 
farmers’ fields at a social optimum, on-farm conservation demands crediting farmers and 
linking conservation with utilization. However, incentive instruments should only be applied 
in areas, where the threat exists of an uncontrolled loss of CGRs. Hence, there is a need to 
first develop an ‘early warning system’ through identifying ‘endangered crops’ and ‘hot-
spots’. This early warning system should be based on the factors influencing farmers’ 
behavior. As discussed, the most important motivating factors for variety diversification are 
mainly farmers’ multiple objectives and concerns, risk and yield insurance considerations, 
land heterogeneity, labor endowment, and lack of access to markets and transaction costs. On 
the contrary, access to extension and market integration, experience in using improved 
varieties and growing cash crops are detaching the link between ‘de facto’ conservation and 
farmers’ economic decisions. If sorghum is a minor crop playing little role for satisfying 
household objectives in a given village, the probability of losing its genetic diversity will be 
high. If there are unique landraces sufficiently important for conservation, in a setting where 
                                                 
10 With all the institutional implications involved such as property rights. Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 8 
 
farmers plant multiple crops, the less important crops should be targeted. It is extremely 
difficult or costly to conserve the CGRs of a less rewarding food crop (like sorghum) in an 
area, where planting a highly rewarding cash crop like cht’at is also an option for farmers. 
The compensation could go far more than the utility farmers expect from growing the less 
rewarding crop.  
After identifying the ‘endangered crops’ and ‘hot spots’, the conservation initiatives could 
follow targeting principles to harmonize on farm conservation with farmers’ survival first 
motives. There is a need for flexible incentive structures to maintain CGRs diversity at a 
social optimum and to offset the negative effect of development interventions. Policy can, for 
instance, start with creating awareness and rewarding farmers who have maintained unique 
traditional varieties of traditional crops.  
If the point of interest is to target farmers who have higher propensity to plant multiple 
traditional varieties, then those farmers who are using sorghum for many purposes, with less 
potential in using improved varieties, and less market orientation are worth targeting. The 
results of this study imply that on-farm conservation gives more sense with farmers who are 
using crop variety portfolio as a risk management strategy. On the other hand, if the objective 
function is to target areas with high probability of losing traditional varieties, localities and 
farmers with better market access and better comparative advantage in improved variety use 
are the priority for action. In this scenario, in situ conservation can be more costly as it will be 
harder to convince these farmers to stick to traditional varieties for the sake of diversity. 
 
References 
Bellon, M.R.,1996. The dynamics of crop infraspecific diversity: a conceptual framework at 
the farmer level. Economic botany, 50 (1), pp. 26-39. 
von Braun, J., Virchow, D., 1996. Economic Evaluation of Biotechnology and Biodiversity in 
Developing Countries. Agriculture and Rural Development, Vol. 3, No. 1.  
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 1990. Regression-based tests for overdisperssion in the Poisson 
model. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 46, pp. 347-364. 
Cameron, A.C., Trivedi, P.K., 1998. Regression analysis of count data. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
van Dusen, M.E., 2000. In-situ conservation of crop genetic resources in the Mexican Milpa 
System. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkley. 
FAO, 1996. Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Utilization of Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. FAO, Rome. 
Hellerstein, D., Mendelsohn, R., 1993. A theoretical foundation for count data models. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75, pp. 604-611. 
Heywood, V.H. (Ed.), 1995. Global Biodiversity Assessment. UNEP, Cambridge University 
Press, UK. 
de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M. and E. Sadoulet, 1991. Peasant household behavior with 
missing markets: some paradoxes explained. Economic Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 1400-
1417. 
McNeely, J. A., 1988. Economics and biological diversity: developing and using economic 
incentives to conserve biological resources. IUCN: International union for 
conservation of nature and natural resources, Gland, Switzerland. 
Meng, E.C., Taylor, J.E. and S.B. Brush, 1998. ‘Implications for the conservation of wheat 
landraces in Turkey from a household model of varietal choice.’ In: Smale, M. (Ed.). 
Farmers, gene banks and crop breeding: economic analyses of diversity in wheat, 
maize, and rice. CIMMYT and Kluwer Academic publishers, pp. 127-142. 
Murduch, J., 1995. Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. Journal of economic 
perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 103-114. 
Pudney, S., 1989. Modelling individual choice: the econometrics of corners, kinks and holes. 
Basil Blackwell, UK. Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 9 
 
Rosenzweig, M.R., Binswanger, H.P., 1993. Wealth, wealth risk and the composition and 
profitability of agricultural investments. The economic journal, Vol. 103, pp. 56-78. 
Roy, A.D., 1952. Safety first and the holding of assets. Econometrica, 20, pp. 431- 449. 
Singh, I., J. Subramanian (1986). Agricultural household modeling in a multicrop 
environment: case studies in Korea and Nigeria. In: Singh, I., L. Squire, J. Strauss, 
Eds. Agricultural household models: extensions, applications and policy. John 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. PP. 95-115. 
Taillie, G.P., Patil, C., 1982. Diversity as a concept and its measurement. Journal of American 
Statistical Association, Vol. 77, pp. 548-568. 
Wale, E. (2003). The economics of on farm conservation of coffee and sorghum diversity in 
Ethiopia. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Bonn, in progress. 
Virchow, D., 1999. Conservation of genetic resources: costs and implications for a 
sustainable utilization of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin.  
Winkelmann, R., 1995. Duration dependence and dispersion in count data models. Journal of 
business and economic statistics, Vol. 13, pp. 467-474. 
 Crop diversity as the derived outcome of farmers’ ‘survival first’ motives - 10 
 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions and expected signs 
Variable name  Description Mean  SD  Expected  sign 
Dependent variable 
Count  The number of traditional varieties varieties 
on-farm less 1  
0.81 0.74 NI 
Explanatory 
variables 
     
Age (Years)  Age of the HH head  41.4  11.97  + 
Totlabor  Total household labor endowment  3.53  1.93  UN 
Lancrops (Hectares)  Quantity of land allocated for all crops  1.51  0.96  + 
Nopurpos  Number of purposes for which sorghum is 
used 
2.54 1.31 + 
Nonffarm (Dummy)  Income source outside agriculture?   0.41  0.49  - 
Educate  Education level of the HH head  1.37  2.08  - 
Impexep  Experience in growing improved varieties 
(years) 
2.05 1.89 - 
Credit (Dummy)  Participation in credit (Dummy)  0.35  0.48  - 
Plots  Number of plots operated by the household  1.75  0.83  + 
Access (Minutes)  The average time required to reach (on foot) 
the extension agent, dry weather road, and 
local market 
47.6 24.6 + 
Gappc (Birr)  Income gap per capita that each household 
fails to satisfy REQPC (if negative) and the 
vice verse (if positive) 
121.8 399.2 - 
Cht’at  (0,  1,  2,  3)  0 – no ch’tat at all; 1 – only for own 
consumption; 2 – also for village sales; 3 – 
also for sales in the cities 
1.21 1.18 - 
Notes: NI = Not important; UN = unpredictable. 
Source: 2001/2002 own survey 
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Table 2: Poisson regression results to explain farmers’ motivations to diversify on 
traditional sorghum varieties 
Variable Coefficient  Marginal  effects: 
Dy/dx 
Age 0.0072
* (1.72)  0.005 
Ch’tat -0.174
*** (-3.08)  -0.110 
Lancrops 0.167
*** (3.50)  0.105 
Impexep -0.186
*** (-4.55)  -0.118 
Nopurpos 0.318
*** (6.80)  0.201 
Totlabor 0.021  (0.95)  0.013 
Access 0.0026  (1.47) 0.002 
Educate 0.0382
* (1.69)  0.024 
Plots 0.0908  (1.44)  0.057 
Gappc -0.0003
** (-2.24)  -0.0002 
Belinarba* 0.1653  (0.98)  0.111 
Kerodeda* 0.363
** (2.20)  0.259 
Asseliso* 0.537
*** (2.70)  0.408 
Ejeaneni* 0.612
*** (3.19)  0.479 
Chachole*  -0.086 (-0.33)   -0.053 
Gurbo* -0.6059  (-0.92)  -0.299 
Credit* -0.006  (-0.06) -0.004 
Nonffarm*  0.0282 (0.22)   0.018 
Constant -1.86
 (-5.60)  
Dependent variable is count        Number of obs = 178 
Wald Chi
2(18) = 210.78              Prob chi
2 = 0.00 
Loglikelihood = -162.72             Pseudo R
2 = 0.185 
NOTES: 
***-Significant at 1%; 
**- Significant at 5% and 
*- Significant at 10%. Values in parenthesis are the ratio of the coefficient to the 
estimated asymptotic standard error. The method of estimation is Stata’s Robust option following Huber/White standard errors 
and covariance. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Source: 2001/2002 own survey 
 
 